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Abstract 
This paper contributes to the debate on fiscal governance for the European 
Monetary Union, assessing the different fiscal rules currently discussed. 
We simulate a small scale macroeconomic model with forward looking 
agents, augmented with a public finances block. We account for both the 
positive (output stabilization) and negative (via risk premia) effects of debt 
and deficit. By the appropriate choice of the exogenous fiscal variables, in 
the fiscal block, we replicate the working of the rules embedded in the so-
called “fiscal compact”: a balanced budget rule (the “new golden rule”), 
and the debt reduction rule (to reach 60% of GDP in 20 years). We 
compare these rules with the Maastricht 3% deficit limit (status quo), and 
with an “investment” rule leaving room for public investment. We evaluate 
the performance in terms of output loss during a fiscal consolidation, as 
well as following demand and supply shocks in steady state. All rules 
guarantee long run sustainability. The investment rule emerges robustly as 
the one guaranteeing the lower output loss, followed by the status quo. The 
“fiscal compact” rules appear to be recessionary. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The paper addresses the macroeconomic impact of a set of different European fiscal 
rules that were, will, or might be implemented. The European fiscal crisis and the ensuing 
requirement to reduce public debt levels paved the way for a set of reforms of the European 
fiscal rules. Two rules are currently discussed to strengthen the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP): the existing limit of public deficit at 3% of GDP (the status quo) could be 
supplemented with a limit on the structural deficit at 0.5% of GDP, and a debt-reduction 
scheme. The limit on structural deficit goes beyond the 3% Maastricht provision in that it 
aims at introducing balanced budget constraints in the Constitution of each euro zone member 
state. It can be labeled a “new golden rule” 1. The debt-reduction scheme imposes high debt 
countries to reduce each year their public debt ratio by one twentieth of the difference with 
the 60% reference level.  
It is hard not to notice a possible paradox: rules aimed at preventing governments from 
intervening in the economy are discussed precisely after the worldwide financial crisis 
triggered governments’ interventions that have helped to dampen shocks ensuing from market 
failures. Thus, the introduction of the above-mentioned rules raises the question of their 
respective incidence on the usual objectives of economic policies, namely the output gap and 
the inflation rate. 
 
The contribution of this paper is to simulate the macroeconomic effects of the 
adoption of these rules in a reduced form small scale New-Keynesian model, in which we 
introduce a public finance block and a yield curve embedding risk premia. We aim at shifting 
the attention back from the objective of fiscal stabilization to the one of macroeconomic 
stabilization. As the proposed rules stand, public deficit and debt are not to be managed as  
means to smooth the cycle. European authorities - governments, the ECB, or the Commission 
- seem to consider them as objectives of policy action rather than what they should be, namely 
instruments for obtaining the final objective of stabilizing output gap and inflation. This 
reversal of targets and instruments is equivalent to a priori denying any role to 
macroeconomic (in particular fiscal) policy. With this exercise we intend to account for the 
negative impact of excessive deficit and debt, while emphasizing their role as instruments for 
attaining the final objective of aggregate welfare maximization. 
 
We assess the macroeconomic impact of adopting the fiscal rules on four economies 
that we take as representative of the euro zone: a large (relatively) low-debt economy 
(France), a small high-debt one (Belgium), a large high-debt one (Italy) and a small-low debt 
one (the Netherlands). The size of nations – large or small – relates to the size of their fiscal 
multiplier. The four countries also differ in terms of the size and sign of their primary 
                                                 
1 Throughout the paper we call the legal endorsement of budget balance “new golden rule” to distinguish it from 
the “old golden rule”, or investment rule.  Introduced in the 1997, the UK golden rule of public finance typically 
excludes public investment from the budget limits over the cycle. See Buiter (2001) for a comprehensive 
discussion.  
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structural balance: France and the Netherlands have a deficit, whereas Belgium and Italy hold 
a surplus. 
We simulate the effect of the rules on the level and variability of the output gap, the 
inflation rate and the structural deficit, and the impact on the level of public debt. This is done 
in a framework in which on one side the evolution of deficit is countercyclical, but on the 
other, excessive debt feeds back into the economy through increasing risk premia. We 
simulate the different rules over a 20-year horizon, consistently with the target of the one 
twentieth debt reduction rule.  
The rules we simulate are (a) the balanced (at 0.5% of GDP) budget or “new golden 
rule”; (b) the 5% yearly debt reduction rule; (c) the 3% total deficit cap (status quo). We also 
evaluate the effect of (d) adopting an investment rule in the vein of the UK golden rule of 
public finances, that broadly speaking imposes budget balance over the cycle only for current 
spending, while allowing public investment to be financed through debt. 
The simulations are carried out starting from a reduced-form New-Keynesian model, 
where the IS and Phillips curves have hybrid specifications with backward and forward 
expectation terms. The solution technique we use is described in Juillard (1996) and 
implemented in DYNARE. It ensures that (partially) forward looking agents form appropriate 
expectations and, in our specification of the economy, it also takes into account the 
nonlinearity of the risk premium and the zero lower bound. It is worth emphasizing here that 
the macroeconomic framework is partly biased against the use of an investment rule, because 
we rule out the endogeneity of potential output, which could be positively affected by public 
investment.   
 
We investigate two related scenarios. First, we analyze the path followed by the four 
economies under the adoption of each fiscal rule, starting from 2010 public debt and deficit 
levels. We ask, in other words, how the rules fare in a fiscal consolidation scenario as the one 
Europe will likely experience in the coming years. Second, we simulate the dynamics of the 
economy after a demand and a supply shock, starting from a Maastricht-type steady state, 
with the economy at a 5% nominal growth rate (3% potential growth plus 2% inflation rate), 
and a 60% debt level. It is worth noticing that the original back-of-the-envelope calculation 
that led to the limits embedded in the Maastricht Treaty is at odds with actual potential growth 
in the Eurozone countries, that since 1992 has been consistently below 3%;  this contributed 
to making the limits to public finances behaviour even more stringent than originally planned. 
 
Results are manifold. First, the adoption of the rules produces in all cases a short-run 
recession, even in small countries with a low multiplier and low initial public debt like the 
Netherlands. Second, recessions sometimes foster deflation. Under the zero lower bound for 
the interest rate, deflation is very difficult to reverse with a binding fiscal constraint. Third, 
the investment rule performs better than the other three rules: recessions are shorter and 
milder; hence the average loss of output over a 20-year horizon is smaller. Fourth, this result 
is strongly robust to changes in the parameters’ values. Fifth, the status quo outperforms the 
“new golden rule” and the debt reduction rule in terms of output loss, although it is more 
inflationary for large countries. Sixth, when the economy is hit by demand and supply shocks 
at the steady state, the status quo seems appropriate to cope with them. This vindicates the 
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claim that the current SGP gives fiscal margins for manoeuvre (see e.g. Buti and Giudice, 
2002). The simulations show nevertheless that the status quo remains costly in comparison 
with the investment rule.  
 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces and discusses the reduced 
form model. In section 3, we simulate the behaviour of large and small countries following 
different types of shocks, and give a quantitative assessment of the macroeconomic 
performance for the different fiscal rules. Section 4 is devoted to a robustness check of the 
main results, and section 5 concludes.  
 
2. An augmented New-Keynesian model  
 
The economy is characterized by a standard framework with the aggregate demand 
side described by a dynamic IS curve, and aggregate supply by a hybrid Phillips curve. By 
hybrid, we mean that expectations are forward and backward-looking. In order to study the 
different fiscal rules, we add to this core a public finances block, with sufficient details so as 
to allow a correct simulation of the differences between the rules. To properly take into 
account the effect of debt, deficit and monetary policy on private agents’ behaviour, we also 
explicitly model the equations for long and short run interest rates. 
 
2.1 The reduced-form model 
 
All variables are deviations from their steady state value, except public finance 
variables which are expressed in percentage of GDP. 
The AD bloc is described by a dynamic hybrid IS curve, detailing the determinants of 
the output gap *t tx y y= − : 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) dt t t t t t t t t tx α x α E x α r E π rr α dsp dsp ε
∗
− + + −= ⋅ + − ⋅ + ⋅ − − + ⋅ − +1 1 1 1 2 1 3 11 ,      (1) 
 
where α1 stands for the incidence of backward-expectations on demand behavior, rt is the 
nominal long-term interest rate, πt is the inflation rate, rr* is the long-term real interest rate;  
dspt is structural primary balance  (i.e. the deficit net of interest payments and of cyclical 
components), and its change over time, (dspt-dspt-1) is the fiscal impulse, or stimulus; α2 and 
α3 are parameters (α2<0, α3>0). The apparently ad hoc nature of the introduction of the fiscal 
impulse should not be overstated. In its simplest form, the expectational IS curve is a 
linearised Euler equation for an economy without capital and government. Backward-looking 
expectations were empirically introduced in the Euler equation, e.g. by Fuhrer and Rudebusch 
(2004). The introduction of government in the model modifies the Euler equation: the 
intertemporal ratio of consumption plus public spending replaces the intertemporal ratio of 
consumption, and the new ratio is set equal to the real interest rate. We assume that public 
spending has a direct incidence on the goods market equilibrium and hence introduce the 
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fiscal impulse – the difference between structural balances at time t and time t-1 – in the 
expectational IS curve.  
 
The aggregate supply block is represented by a standard hybrid Phillips curve, where 
λ1 stands for the incidence of backward-expectations on supply behavior and λ2 is the 
elasticity of inflation to the output gap and is a positive parameter: 
 
− += ⋅ + − ⋅ + ⋅ + st t t t t tπ λ π λ E π λ x ε1 1 1 1 2(1 )   (2) 
 
 The third equation describes the very simple behavior of nominal (2-year) long-term 
interest rates rt along the yield curve, where i stands for (1-year) short-term interest rate, and γ 
represents the risk premium associated with debt variations above the target b*: 
 
++ = + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ − + ft t t t t tr i E i γ b b ε2 1(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) [1 ( max(0, *)]  (3) 
 
Monetary policy is described through a usual Taylor rule. The central banker sets the 
nominal short-term interest rate in response to expected future inflation and current output 
gap, with a close-to-zero bound on the nominal rate (here at 0.25%): 
 
max ( . , * Φ ( *) Φ )1 1 1 20 25 + += + + ⋅ − + ⋅ + mt t t t t t ti rr E π E π π x ε  (4) 
 
 In equations (1) to (4) the error terms ε stand for exogenous shocks. Hence εd and εs 
represent a demand and a supply shock respectively. 
 
The public finance block is made explicit to facilitate the introduction of different 
fiscal rules in the model. Total government deficit can be decomposed into a cyclical 
component and a structural component: 
 
t t tdt dc ds≡ +   (5) 
 
The cyclical component, or cyclical deficit, depends linearly on the output gap, 
because of the working of automatic stabilizers (see e.g. Girouard and Andre, 2005): 
 
= ⋅t tdc ψ x1   (6) 
 
The structural deficit is the sum of interest payments and structural primary deficit: 
 
t t tds ip dsp= +  (7) 
 
where, denoting with b the stock of public debt, interest payments are denoted by 1t t tip r b −= ⋅ . 
The latter part of the structural deficit is close to the discretionary part of fiscal policy. The 
annual difference in the structural primary deficit stands for the annual fiscal impulse.  
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Public debt follows the usual law of motion: 
 
∗
−
+ += ⋅ − +t t tt t 1 tπ x yb b 1 dt100( )  (8) 
 
The model has a steady state with a potential growth rate y* of the economy exogenously 
set at 3%, in accordance with the underlying hypothesis of the European Union Treaty. The 
real natural interest rate rr* also equals 3%, the debt target b* is 60% and the inflation target 
π* is 2%. The steady-state public deficit is thus equal to interest payments (3%), and primary 
balance is achieved. 
 
2.2 Calibration 
 
The output gap and inflation rate in the expectational IS and Phillips curve equations 
are introduced with half-backward and half-forward-looking components (α1= λ1 = 0.5. For 
the IS-augmented curve, this seems to be a reasonable hypothesis considering the average 
results by Fuhrer and Rudebusch (2004) over a wide range of estimations. Estimations by 
Goodhart and Hofmann (2005) however point to a relatively lower incidence of forward-
looking expectations for the US and Euro area economies, which would put α1 in the range of 
[0.2, 0.4]. The parameters of the expectations-augmented-Phillips curve are more 
controversial (and estimations are more numerous). Gali et al. (2005) and Goodhart and 
Hofmann (2005) find that the coefficient on past inflation is rather modest (both around 0.2-
0.3). Rudd and Whelan (2006), on the contrary, conclude that the forward-looking component 
is insignificant, and recent evaluation drawing on survey-based expectations concludes that 
the hybrid Phillips curve (with a significant backward term) outperforms the New-Keynesian 
Phillips curve (having no inflation persistence), and found that the forward-looking 
coefficient was close to λ1 = 0.5 (see Paloviita, 2008). We decided to follow this road, which 
is agnostic with respect to a debate that is yet unsettled. At any rate, we included λ1 (and α1) 
among the parameters for which we made robustness checks. 
 
Table 1 reports the parameters in the simulations. The coefficient value of the 
incidence of the output gap in the hybrid Phillips curve is close to Paloviita’s (2008) estimate. 
The parameters in the monetary rule are taken from Taylor (1993). The targets are consistent 
with the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact’s requirements. Two different 
values for the coefficient of the fiscal impulse in the expectational IS equation are introduced, 
in order to take into account the higher external leakage of a domestic fiscal policy in a small 
(and open) economy. The robustness of the simulations to a range of parameters’ values was 
performed and is reported in section 4.   
 
 
2.3 Fiscal rules 
 
The medium-to-long term performance of European economies crucially depends on 
the macroeconomic governance tools put in place by the EU. Three main options are before 
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policy makers: (a) a status quo where the ratio of public deficit to GDP must be maintained 
below the 3% limit. (b)  The “new golden rule of public finances”, with the objective of 
balanced structural deficit, i.e. a balanced total deficit over the cycle. (c) A constant reduction 
of the debt ratio that would bring it to 60% of GDP in twenty years (i.e., 5% per year of the 
initial difference). Proposals (b) and (c) were both mentioned in the December 2011 Council 
conclusions; and in January 2012, all EU countries, except the UK and the Czech Republic, 
accepted the “fiscal compact” embedding the “new golden rule” in their legislation at a 
constitutional level. We add an alternative reform proposal namely (d) the “investment rule” 
that allows to finance an increase in public net assets by public debt issuance. These four rules 
differ on the criteria and on the type of constraints imposed to countries. We show below that 
in assessing their impact, both the size and the initial debt level play a crucial role. 
 
 
Table 1: Calibration Parameter Values 
α1 0.5 
α2 - 0.2 
α3 0.8 (large country / 0.2 (small country) 
λ1 0.5 
λ2 0.2 
γ 0.01 
Φ1 0.5 
Φ2 0.5 
ψ1 - 0.5 
y* 3% 
b* 60% 
π* 2% 
discount rate 0.95 [=1/1.05] 
 
In the fiscal block, what variables are endogenous and what are exogenous depends on 
the fiscal rule that is followed. Thus, we for the status quo, we impose that total deficit is 
exogenously given at 3%: 
dt = 3 
 
Because the limit is not always fulfilled in practice, we evaluate the path of 
convergence towards the status quo, from the initial, larger, public deficits of the countries 
under study. 
 
The European Council’s conclusion, on December 9, 2011, states that “General 
government budgets shall be balanced or in surplus; this principle shall be deemed respected 
if, as a rule, the annual structural deficit does not exceed 0.5% of nominal GDP.” Therefore, 
when simulating the balanced budget rule or “new golden rule”, structural deficit is 
exogenous and constrained at:  
ds = 0.5 
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The “investment rule” allows increasing public investment up to a threshold equal to 
the inflation depreciation of current debt. Thus, everything else equal, the “investment rule” 
keeps the real level of public debt constant. Public investment increases public debt only 
insofar as it goes beyond this threshold. The possible incidence of higher investment on debt 
may produce higher net interest charges: they are assumed to be compensated with a lower 
cyclically-adjusted primary deficit, e.g. with lower current expenditures dcur. The 
“investment rule” is described as follows:   
dsp = invg + dcur 
invg = (π/100). b* 
dcur = -(1/10).ip + (9/10).dcurt-1, 
 
where the last equation assumes that the current surplus needed to finance interest rate 
payments is spread over a ten-year period. Notice  that this is a “mild” version of the rule 
because, first investment is accepted only up to the limit that keeps the debt ratio on a 
stationary path.; second, because we make the assumption that public investment has not 
impact on potential growth (that we assume constant), so that it is analytically equivalent to 
current spending. This puts us in a “worst case scenario”, in which we artificially shut off the 
main advantages of the investment rule. 
As regards the one twentieth (5% debt reduction) rule advocated by the European 
Commission, the exogenous variable is the yearly change in debt. Furthermore, the “fiscal 
compact” implicitly assumes that once the 60% debt threshold is attained the “new golden 
rule” becomes binding. Hence, the one twentieth rule runs as follows: 
 
*
*
1
0
>⎧= ⎨ ≤⎩
if b b
delta
if b b
 
dt = δ.(-0.05.(binit-b*)) + (1- δ).(ψ1.x + 0.5) 
 
 
Initial Values 
Initial debts and deficits for the four countries under study are 2010 OECD figures. 
They are reported in Table 2 below. By assumption, France and Italy are considered as larger 
countries than Belgium and the Netherlands; hence the fiscal multiplier of the former is equal 
to 0.8 rather than 0.2 for the latter.  
 
 
Table 2: Initial Debt and Deficit Values, 2010 
 Initial Debt Initial Structural Primary Deficit 
Fiscal 
multiplier* 
France 94 2.63 0.8 
Italy 127 - 1.84 0.8 
Belgium 101 - 0.63 0.2 
Netherlands 71 2.62 0.2 
Source: OECD 
*: assumption 
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3.  Assessing the impact of the different amendment proposals of the 
Stability and Growth Pact 
 
To our knowledge, there are very few examples of papers attempting at the evaluation 
of different fiscal rules in the EU context. Most recent papers dealing with this issue focus on 
one type of rule, like an expenditure rule (e.g. Hauptmeier et al., 2011), whereas those which 
study different rules use the classification by Kopits and Symansky (1998) (e.g. Creel and 
Saraceno, 2009, 2010; and Schuknecht et al., 2011). In contrast, Creel et al. (2011) performed 
a comparison between various fiscal rules within a simple simulation exercise in the vein of 
Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1998) and Monperrus-Veroni and Saraceno (2005). These 
exercises start from a simple reduced form VAR system that has its theoretical basis in a new 
Keynesian aggregate demand/Phillips curve model: the dependent variables are the output gap 
and inflation, while domestic public deficits are among the explanatory variables. The 
estimation results are the basis for a counterfactual assessment of the effect of alternative 
budgetary rules. Such an exercise has many shortcomings, the main being that it represents a 
typical Lucas' Critique victim: had the rules been applied in the past, agents would have 
embedded their consequences in their behaviors which would have been different. Actual data 
hence have a limited explaining power when trying to quantify the effects of alternative 
policies. The paper by Eichengreen and Wyplosz nevertheless retained a remarkable interest 
because it gave a measure of the magnitude of costs and benefits of the Pact; furthermore, in 
the extension of Creel et al. (2011), that included debt among the explanatory variables, it had 
the advantage of allowing a meaningful and consistent comparison of different institutional 
arrangements.  
 
Creel et al. (2011) show that both for single and coordinated consolidations non-
Keynesian crowding-in effects (if any) are more than compensated by the standard textbook 
contractionary effect of fiscal consolidations, even if the reduction of debt tends to soften this 
effect. As a consequence, the status quo and the “new golden rule” fare considerably worse 
than the debt and the investment rules. This has to be ascribed to the fact that in the two latter 
cases the debt ratio decreases over time, and that this has positive effects on the long run 
performance of the economy. It is also interesting to notice that the reduction of debt is 
considerably more beneficial in the two large economies, France and Italy, than in Belgium. 
 
Our analysis in this paper completes these results, because instead of relying on data it 
builds on a theoretical model, and the differences across countries are given by parameters 
(notably the weight of government spending in the output gap equation), and by initial 
conditions of public finance variables.  
 
We first discuss the application of the different fiscal rules to a consolidation 
occurring in the 4 countries starting from current conditions, and then we examine the case of 
supply and demand shocks hitting an economy at the Maastricht-type steady state. We will 
then perform a robustness test over the parameter space. 
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3.1 Fiscal Consolidation and Alternative Rules 
 
Figures 1 to 4 show output gap and inflation, together with interest rates and the public 
finance variables, for France. The figures for the other countries are qualitatively similar and 
are presented in the Appendix. The economy starts from current levels of deficit and debt, and 
is tracked for the next 20 years. We decided to focus on fiscal consolidation abstracting from 
the initial size of the output gap and inflation which as a consequence in the simulations are 
set at their steady state values (0 for the output gap and the 2% central bank target for 
inflation)2. 
 
Before discussing the details of each rule, it is worth pointing out two things. First, all 
the rules yield long run convergence of output gap and inflation towards their steady state 
levels. Likewise, after an initial worsening, the debt ratio steadily decreases albeit at different 
rates. The convergence of the output gap towards zero implies that deficit also stabilizes, at 
the level necessary for interest rate payments. The second feature that is common to all the 
rules is the deep recession induced by consolidation in the short run which may even be 
deflationary and results in a sharp drop of interest rates. This initial drop in activity explains 
the initial increase of the debt ratio, thus supporting the argument in favour of more gradual 
consolidation, even in what concerns public debt sustainability. 
 
Looking at the rules in detail, the 5% yearly debt reduction yields the larger initial 
drop of output, requiring more than a decade of total budget surplus. Furthermore, monetary 
policy loses traction, because it quickly hits the zero lower bound. On the other hand, the long 
run reduction of debt is more substantial than for the other rules. Looking at figures 1 and 3 
we remark that the status quo (3% total deficit limit) and the structural balance rule (the “new 
golden rule”: a 0.5% structural deficit limit) yield very similar output gap patterns, but the 
constraints to deficit in the case of structural deficits is more deflationary (inflation is negative 
for 10 periods). Short term rates drop almost to zero, and as a consequence interest payments 
are lower than in the status quo. This in turn yields faster debt reduction in the medium to 
long run. 
 
Finally the investment rule – figure 4 – yields much larger deficit levels in the short run, and 
hence a small increase of debt over the first 8 years. On the other hand, the rule turns out to be 
the least recessionary in the short run, with an output gap that even at the peak remains below 
a negative 1%. 
 
To compare the different rules, we computed for each country (i.e. initial public finances 
values) the average of the discounted variables of interest (assuming a discount rate of 5%). 
They are reported in Table 3 . The table shows that for the four countries the average loss of 
output is considerably lower in the case of the investment rule than in the others, which in 
addition is associated with lower variability. As can be guessed from the figures above, this 
                                                 
2 If we began with the current values of the (negative) output gap and inflation, the initial drop of output would 
be larger, and the interest rate would hit faster the zero lower bound.  
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can most probably be attributed to the lesser recessionary impact in the early phase of the 
consolidation process. 
 
Table 3: Discounted Average Values of the Rules for 20 years 
France Italy 
 
Status 
Quo 
Inv. 
Rule 
New 
Golden 
Rule 
5% 
Debt 
Red. 
 Status Quo 
Inv. 
Rule 
New 
Golden 
Rule 
5% 
Debt 
Red. 
mean(x) -0.14 -0.11 -0.20 -0.36 mean(x) -0.05 -0.04 -0.11 -0.24 
s.d.(x) 0.44 0.25 0.49 1.42 s.d.(x) 0.16 0.18 0.26 1.18 
          
mean(π) 0.49 0.09 0.12 0.29 mean(π) 1.03 0.69 0.74 0.80 
s.d.(π) 0.36 0.58 0.58 1.01 s.d.(π) 0.25 0.39 0.32 1.03 
          
mean(ds) 2.00 1.62 0.5 -0.45 mean(ds) 1.91 1.14 0.5 -1.30 
s.d.(ds) 1.23 1.46 0 2.11 s.d.(ds) 0.71 0.98 0 2.03 
          
b (t = 20) 87.3 83.9 61.2 40.6 b (t = 20) 89.6 77.8 64.0 34.3 
          
Belgium Netherlands 
 Status 
Quo 
Inv. 
Rule 
New 
Golden 
Rule 
5% 
Debt 
Red. 
 Status Quo 
Inv. 
Rule 
New 
Golden 
Rule 
5% 
Debt 
Red. 
mean(x) -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 -0.09 mean(x) -0.05 -0.02 -0.08 -0.09 
s.d.(x) 0.07 0.05 0.15 0.29 s.d.(x) 0.14 0.05 0.23 0.33 
          
mean(π) 1.10 0.97 1.10 1.18 mean(π) 1.07 0.89 1.05 1.13 
s.d.(π) 0.31 0.34 0.22 0.33 s.d.(π) 0.27 0.36 0.23 0.24 
          
mean(ds) 1.92 1.61 0.5 -0.31 mean(ds) 2.00 2.34 0.5 0.38 
s.d.(ds) 0.71 1.21 0 1.45 s.d.(ds) 1.01 1.62 0 1.36 
          
b (t = 20) 78.1 67.8 46.3 35.6 b (t = 20) 66.3 69.3 35.1 32.5 
Average discounted values over 20 years. In bold, the best performance (larger average output gap, smaller 
structural deficit and inflation rate) according to the mean or standard deviation. 
 
 
As regards inflation, the investment rule yields lower inflation on average, even if in 
this case the status quo exhibits lower variability for all countries except the Netherlands. 
However, the results for inflation are more difficult to interpret; as figures 1 to 4 show, during 
the consolidation the economy may go (in all the cases except the status quo) through a period 
of deflation. Thus, a low average inflation may not denote stable prices, but a prolonged 
period of price deflation. 
 
Setting aside the investment rule, which is not a policy option in the current debate, we 
can observe that the status quo performs considerably better than the balanced budget or the 
5% debt reduction rules, even if for large countries it is more inflationary.  
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As would be expected, on the other hand, the debt rule and the “new golden rule” yield 
substantially lower debt levels at t=20. In fact, both rules would yield, as a new steady state 
value, a null debt ratio (see, e.g. Creel and Saraceno, 2009). 
 
To conclude, for all possible initial situations (large and small countries; high and low 
initial debt), the model yields the unequivocal result that implementing the investment rule 
would minimise the average loss of output, and also prove less inflationary than the different 
alternatives currently discussed in the European Union. Among these, the status quo is largely 
to be preferred if we use the output gap as a metrics, while structural balance and debt 
reduction are both less inflationary and yield faster debt reduction. 
 
 
3.2 Supply and Demand Shocks in Steady State 
 
The previous section dealt with the performance of the different rules during a 
consolidation process, starting from high debt ratios. Here we ask how the same rules would 
affect the dynamics of the economy if it were hit by a demand shock (in the output gap 
equation) or by a supply shock (in the Phillips curve equation) while in steady state. The 
results are summarized in Table 4, where we distinguish between “small” countries (with a 
low fiscal multiplier) and “large” ones (with a large fiscal multiplier) 
 
We did not test the debt reduction rule, because that is typically a rule that applies 
when away from steady state. Table 4 shows first of all that the differences between the 
different rules are not substantial, though they exist, a result that were to be expected given 
that we are studying adjustments close to the steady state. Second, also not surprising, the best 
performance in terms of cumulated output gap is generally the status quo. In fact, the two 
other rules are more “structural”, as they yield ever decreasing reductions in the debt ratio, 
and not a convergence to its reference 60% value. It follows then that for reasonable shocks 
they impose an excessive restriction. The status quo rule allows cyclical deficits and hence the 
reabsorption of the shock at a minimum cost. 
 
Though not surprising, this conclusion is important for two reasons. First, it shows that 
the main drawback with the current SGP rule – the status quo – is the difficulty to reach the 
steady state, because once it is there, the rule leaves enough space for output stabilization. The 
lack of enforcement of the rule by EU governments has certainly had to do with the costly 
convergence path (for many countries) that we described in the previous section. Second, the 
good performance of the status quo in comparison with the investment rule and the “new 
golden rule” is obtained with relatively high average levels of public structural deficit and 
debt. Public structural deficits are close to 2% of GDP for the 4 countries under study, 
whereas public debts are slightly above 60% of GDP 20 years after the shocks. Once more, 
the simulations show that persisting structural deficits are not necessarily inconsistent with 
output stabilization and public finances sustainability, and that, because of depressed growth, 
debt ratios can actually increase during fiscal consolidation. 
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Table 4 - Response to Demand and Supply Shocks Starting from Steady State 
Small countries - Fiscal Multiplier = 0.2 
Negative Demand Shock Positive Supply Shock 
 Status Quo Inv. Rule 
New 
Golden 
Rule 
 Status Quo Inv. Rule 
New 
Golden 
Rule 
mean(x) -0.07 -0.08 -0.10 mean(x) 0.05 0.05 0.02 
s.d.(x) 0.22 0.23 0.31 s.d.(x) 0.09 0.07 0.04 
        
mean(π) 1.01 0.96 0.96 mean(π) 0.99 0.98 0.96 
s.d.(π) 0.24 0.25 0.26 s.d.(π) 0.28 0.29 0.33 
        
mean(ds) 1.83 1.35 0.5 mean(ds) 1.89 1.37 0.5 
s.d.(ds) 0.48 0.62 0 s.d.(ds) 0.57 0.67 0 
        
b (t = 20) 62.5 49.9 31.6 b (t = 20) 61.6 48.1 30.1 
 
Large countries - Fiscal Multiplier = 0.8 
Negative Demand Shock Positive Supply Shock 
 Status Quo 
Investme
nt Rule 
New 
Golden 
Rule 
 Status Quo 
Investme
nt Rule 
New 
Golden 
Rule 
mean(x) -0.05 -0.09 -0.14 mean(x) 0.08 0.04 -0.02 
s.d.(x) 0.17 0.23 0.36 s.d.(x) 0.23 0.09 0.09 
        
mean(π) 1.02 0.75 0.67 mean(π) 0.93 0.81 0.67 
s.d.(π) 0.28 0.31 0.38 s.d.(π) 0.26 0.28 0.44 
        
mean(ds) 1.84 1.13 0.5 mean(ds) 1.91 1.19 0.5 
s.d.(ds) 0.50 0.53 0 s.d.(ds) 0.60 0.61 0 
        
b (t = 20) 62.8 48.9 34.7 b (t = 20) 62.8 47.1 33.0 
Average discounted values over 20 years. In bold the best performance (larger average output gap, 
smaller structural deficit and inflation rate). 
 
Finally, our results highlight the fact that it is almost impossible to reach a “one-size-
fits-all” most preferred fiscal rule for all EU countries. Drawing on 4 different countries like 
Belgium, France, Italy and the Netherlands, it appears that rules perform differently according 
to the nature of the shock and the objective. For instance, the investment rule performs 
slightly better than other rules after a demand shock in a small country as far as the mean of 
inflation is the policy objective, whereas the “new golden rule” performs better after a 
demand shock in a large country or after a supply shock in a small country. 
 
4. Robustness 
The results of our simulations show rather univocally that the “old” golden 
(investment) rule, fares better than the others in most situations. We checked for the 
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robustness of these results, performing a Monte Carlo experiment over the space of the most 
relevant parameters. The objective was to make sure that the comparison between time series 
analyzed above were not dependent of the particular set of parameter chosen in Table 1. 
 
We investigated the more representative parameters, i.e. the ones denoting the degree 
of backward looking expectations in the IS and Phillips curves (α1 and λ1 respectively); the 
impact of real interest rates (α2) and of the fiscal impulse (α3) on the output gap (IS curve);  
the impact of the output gap on inflation in the Phillips curve (λ2); and finally, the risk 
premium in the long term interest rates equation (γ).  
The simulation was conducted as follows: 
a)  We made random draws of the parameters, within a certain range chosen, when 
possible, to be consistent with the existing literature. 
b) For each draw we solved the model with DYNARE using the 4 rules. We used French 
debt and deficit levels as the starting values. 
c) We selected the run only if DYNARE yielded convergence of the solution algorithm 
under the 4 rules. 
d) We recorded the average of discounted output gap values and inflation for each rule, 
and each parameter draw, over 20 periods. 
The range of the 6 parameters random draws is reported in Table 5. It is worth noting 
that for α1, the IS “forward looking” parameter, convergence was obtained in a rather 
significantly smaller interval than the one we had initially chosen. Looking at the details of 
the simulation, it appears that excessive values of the parameter (below 0.3 or above 0.55) 
yield no convergence of the solution algorithm for the debt reduction rule. For the other 
parameters, the range chosen ex ante turned out to be fine in terms of convergence. A possible 
explanation of why the debt reduction rule often fails to converge might be that with 
expectations in the IS equation excessively backward-looking (α1 between 0.5 and 0.8) the 
strong reduction of debt widens negatively the output gap which in turns increase the cyclical 
deficit and makes the budget adjustment even more severe. In the mean time, the debt/GDP 
ratio does not decrease and interest payments continue to negatively influence the budget and 
so the output gap.  In a more forward-looking setup, the reduction of the output gap is 
compensated by the expected future positive output gap once the debt has been reduced and 
the budget balanced. 
 
We ran around 4000 simulations, and for about 8% of them (333) the solution 
algorithm converged for the 4 rules. Once again, non-convergence was most of the time due 
to the debt reduction rule. 
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Table 5: Parameter Ranges for the Monte Carlo 
Parameter Range 
α1 [0.2  0.8]   ([0.3  0.55])a 
α2 [-0.9  -0.1] 
α3 [0.2  0.8] 
λ1 [0.2  0.8] 
λ2 [0.1  0.5] 
γ [0  0.03] 
a Range with convergence for the 4 rules 
 
The 333 converging iterations formed our dataset. In Table 6 we report the descriptive 
statistics of the 333 simulations for the sum of discounted output gap and inflation over the 
twenty years following the adoption of each of the four rules. 
 
It may first be noticed that the results are remarkably stable. Except for the one 
twentieth rule, the distribution is strongly centred on the mean and the median. The standard 
deviation of the average of the discounted sum output gap and inflation is significant for the 
one twentieth rule, but virtually null for the 3 other rules. This confirms that the debt 
reduction rule, even when converging, is more sensitive than the others to parameter 
variations. 
 
 Table 6: Monte Carlo Simulation. Average Output Gap and Inflation 
 Output Gap Inflation 
 Status Quo 
New 
Golden 
Rule 
Inv. 
 Rule 
5% 
Debt 
Red. 
Status 
Quo 
New 
Golden 
Rule 
Inv. 
 Rule 
5% 
Debt 
Red. 
min -0.145 -0.198 -0.114 -0.898 0.468 0.101 0.090 -1.681 
max -0.144 -0.195 -0.102 -0.355 0.626 0.231 0.126 0.664 
mean -0.145 -0.196 -0.104 -0.394 0.487 0.118 0.093 0.152 
median -0.145 -0.195 -0.104 -0.357 0.485 0.116 0.092 0.285 
s.d. 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.135 0.016 0.014 0.003 0.493 
Average over the 333 simulations of the discounted sum of tx  and tπ . Best Performance in bold. 
 
 
Turning at the analysis of the results, we notice that the investment rule fares 
significantly better than the others in terms of output gap. If the “old” golden rule were to be 
applied during the consolidation process, the cost in terms of output gap would be of 
approximately one third lower than for the status quo rule. The two rules of the “fiscal 
compact” would yield an average discounted output gap sum, over the parameter range, of 
twice (balanced budget) or 4 times as much (debt reduction) than the investment rule. The 
Monte Carlo experiment, therefore, confirms that the results of the time series are robust to 
parameter changes. As we highlighted for figures 1 to 4, the results concerning inflation are 
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more difficult to interpret, as a lower level is not necessarily better in potentially deflationary 
situations. 
To conclude, the sensitivity analysis conducted on the parameter space showed that 
the results commented in section 3 are robust, i.e. that for a large range of parameter values 
the investment rule outperforms the others in term of output loss. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper evaluates the macroeconomic impact of a set of different European fiscal 
rules that were, will, or might be implemented. We simulate a small-scale New Keynesian 
model with both forward- and backward expectations. The calibration draws on the results of 
the literature and on the 2010 values of public finance data of 4 euro zone countries which we 
take as representative of all types of euro zone member states. The four fiscal rules are: the 
status quo 3% limit on public deficit, a balanced-budget rule, a debt reduction scheme and an 
investment rule in the vein of the UK golden rule of public finances. 
We focused on two different scenarios. The first involves fiscal consolidation from 
current debt and deficit levels, towards the Maastricht reference values. The second assesses 
the impact of demand and supply shocks affecting the economy when at steady state. 
Three types of simulations are performed. The macroeconomic impact of four fiscal 
rules are assessed after, respectively, a demand and a supply shock. Beforehand, we assess the 
path followed by the four economies under each fiscal rule, starting from their respective 
2010 public debt and deficit levels. As such, the latter simulations convey macro insights on 
the dynamic path towards different rules’ fulfillment, including the institutional status quo. 
 
The main results are first, that abiding by the rules produces in all cases a short-run 
recession, even in countries with a small multiplier and a low initial public debt like the 
Netherlands. Second, during a consolidation phase, the investment rule performs better than 
the other rules: the recession is milder and shorter, thus leading to a substantially lower 
average loss of output over a 20-year horizon. Third, if the economy is hit by a demand or 
supply shock at steady state, the status quo seems fit to ensure that the economy is stabilized, 
while the more ‘structural’ rules turn out to be too recessionary. Finally, the two provisions of 
the “fiscal compact”, balanced budget and constant debt reduction, seem to generally impose 
large costs to the economy, while not necessarily performing better in terms of public 
finances’ sustainability. These results are robust to parameter changes. 
 
This leads to a general concluding remark. The “fiscal compact” discussed by 
European leaders in early 2010s requires a constant debt reduction, together with a “semi-
balanced” (at 0.5%) structural deficit. This implies that, once the target level of 60% is 
reached, the debt ratio will continue to decrease, led by the structural deficit balance. Our 
results show that these rules are extremely costly, in terms of output loss, if compared to the 
investment rule or even the status quo. Nevertheless, even neglecting these results, it appears 
clear that in normal times, i.e. when countries are not confronted with the issue of abnormal 
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debt levels, these rules are unfit, and contradictory with the original treaty targets of a 60% 
debt ratio.  If such a drastic consolidation strategy were adopted, it would be unwarranted, and 
unwise, to embed it into constitutional laws, thus forcing the euro zone economies to 
converge to a zero debt steady state.  
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Figure 1 – France – Status Quo 
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Figure 2 – France – New Golden Rule 
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Figure 3 – France – Debt Reduction rule 
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Figure 4 – France – Investment Rule 
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